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1.  Introduction 
Remaining global conventional crude oil resources are on the order of 3 trillion barrels, 
with more than 50% of that amount in the Persian Gulf.  Consequently, Persian Gulf oil has been 
of considerable interest to Western oil companies and governments (and to Russia) for more than 
a century.  In earlier work in this journal, we argued that a target price range framework initiated 
in 1986 had resulted in stable crude oil prices and reliable supply.  Western military support has 
been an important part of this framework, which constituted a Nash equilibrium between Gulf 
producers and Western (and Asian) consumers (see Chapman and Khanna, 2001). 
Has the current war in Iraq destroyed the target price band arrangement?  This paper 
attempts to answer that question by analyzing the interaction of politics and military security in 
the global oil market since the 1980s.  With the very low cost of production in the region (about 
$5 per barrel) and the great magnitude of resources, the oil wealth in the Gulf is on the order of 
$75 trillion.  We will argue that it is the existence of this wealth that creates a major policy 
problem for the eight countries in this region, and for global security.  We will also argue that the 
framework that ensured a steady supply at mutually acceptable prices to the Persian Gulf 
producers and the Western consumers has itself contributed to growing instability in individual 
countries, and the rise of Al Qaeda and similar groups.  We conclude the paper with an outline of 
a proposed road map for the future. 
 
II.  Brief History:  Petroleum, the Persian Gulf, and the West 
Today’s issues with security and oil have long roots.  Table 1 summarizes the colonial 
history of the Persian Gulf countries and the evolution to their current governments.  Turkey’s 
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Ottoman Empire controlled most of the region at different periods over a 7-century span in the 
last millennium.  The slow disintegration of the Empire was accelerated by the search for oil for 
naval vessels by Britain and France early in the 20th Century.  After the 1907 Anglo-Russian 
Convention, Britain obtained concessions in southern Iran whereas Russia sought to control the 
northern sphere.  In the years after World War I (WWI), Britain created borders throughout the 
Persian Gulf that ensured easy access to oilfields and much of the oil in this region came under 
the production control of Western oil companies.  Initially British Petroleum,  CFP (Compangie 
Francaise de Petroles), and Royal Dutch/Shell dominated the region, reflecting the European 
concern for secure sources of petroleum.  Russia and the Soviet Union also sought to establish 
their influence in the Persian Gulf but were mostly unsuccessful except for brief periods in Iran 
and Iraq.  By the 1950's, however, American oil companies had become full partners.  Figure 1 
summarizes the composition of major oil production companies in 1972.   
Virtually every country in the Persian Gulf region was under direct or indirect British 
control until the middle of the 20th century.  Of course WWII interrupted British dominance in 
the region, but in effect, between WWI and the 1950s, Britain maintained military security in the 
Persian Gulf region.  Between the 1950s and 1990, there were several international events that 
influenced the relationship between the Persian Gulf producers and the Western consumers of 
oil.  These include conflict over the Suez Canal, the OPEC oil embargo, and the Iran-Iraq war.  
In 1986, OPEC and Western oil importers established the target price range arrangement, which 
continued into 2004 (see Figure 2 below and discussion).  Throughout this period, there were 
minimal military security arrangements.  It was only after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1991 that the 
United States (and to a lesser extent, the United Nations) established a significant military 
presence in this region with a view to maintaining military security. 
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Table 1: Persian Gulf Countries:  Notes on Government and Colonial History 
 
Bahrain British Protectorate from 1861 until independence in 1971. Monarchy.  Al Khalifa 
family rule since 1783.  Constitution, National Assembly created in 1973.  National 
Assembly dissolved in 1975.  In 1993, Consultative Council of appointed members 
formed.   Government friendly to U.S. 
Iran Monarchy with significant British influence and parliamentary democracy to 1951.  
Conflict over oil nationalization until parliamentary democracy displaced by Shah 
monarchy in 1953 with assistance of US-CIA.  Revolution in 1979 replaced Shah with 
an Islamic Republic, a combination of clerical theocracy and limited electoral 
democracy. The supreme spiritual leader has final authority in all executive, legislative, 
and judicial matters.  Executive branch headed by an elected president.  The Majlis is 
the legislative Consultative Body.  Attitude of different parts of government and public 
to U.S.: complex. 
Iraq Turkish control until 1906.  A British mandate after WWI.  Monarchy overthrown in 
1958 by army with communist support.  Ba’ath Socialist Party took control in 1968 
with minor assistance from US-CIA.  Saddam Hussein established dictatorship in 
1979.  Government hostile to U.S. until American occupation in 2003. 
Kuwait British protectorate until independence in 1961.  Monarchy.  Al Sabah family rule.  
Constitution in 1962 vests power in an emir selected from ruling family. Elected 
National Assembly exists but subject to dissolution or suspension by the emir.  
Government friendly to U.S. 
Oman Independence from Portuguese control in 1650.  British protectorate from 1789 until 
1951.  Monarchy.  Al Said family rule.  In 1991, a Consultative Council of regional 
representatives was formed.  Government friendly to U.S. 
Qatar Ottoman control from 1878 until World War I.  British Protectorate until 
independence in 1971.  Monarchy.  Al Thani family rule. In 1999 municipal elections 
were held.  Government Friendly to U.S. 
Saudi Independence from the Turkish Empire after WWI.  Unification in 1932.  Monarchy. 
Arabia Al Saud family rule.  No elections or political parties.  Consultative Council of   
appointed members initiates laws and reviews policy. Government friendly to U. S. 
United Independence from Britain in 1971.  Confederation of monarchies.  Rulers of 7 
Arab constituent emirates (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, Ras 
Emirates al-Khaimah, and Fujairah) participate in a Supreme Council which elects one of the  
Emirs as President for a 5 year term.  The Federal National Council is appointed.  
Government friendly to U.S. 
 
Sources: CIA (2003), Banks and Muller (1999), Encyclopedia Britannica online, Kinross 
(1977), Kurian (1992), Morris (2003), Roosevelt (1979), Sampson (1975), Yergin (1992).  
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Figure 1: 1972 Joint Oil Production Companies Composition
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Against this historical backdrop, we can understand the evolution of the pricing structure 
in the global oil market.  Due to their dominance in the region and low extraction costs, British 
Petroleum and the European companies were a major factor in the global market that established 
real world oil prices at a few dollars per barrel during the first half of the 20th century.  With the 
emergence of American oil companies such as Aramco and other Figure 1 companies in the early 
1950s, the market price was determined jointly by these companies.  OPEC was established in 
1960 to raise company-determined prices, but remained ineffectual for the first few years.  
However, the 1973 Arab-Israeli war created a surge of nationalism in the Arab world.  OPEC 
nations, led by Saudi Arabia, seized the authority to control oil production within their countries.  
Their efforts to raise oil prices were initially successful – oil prices reached nearly $40 per barrel 
– but had collapsed by 1986 with crude prices at $10 per barrel. 
In 1986 then-Vice President George H. Bush went to the Persian Gulf and worked with 
the Saudi King and government to stabilize oil prices at a higher level (Yergin, 1992, pages 755-
758).  The price range framework that was created in 1986 is essentially the price structure that 
existed into 2004.  From 1986 to 1997 OPEC maintained prices within the first target range of 
$15-20 per barrel.  Average crude oil prices for all 12 years are within 75 cents of the first target 
range, except the 1990 price when Iraq invaded Kuwait.  This price range collapsed in 1998 due 
to the combined influences of the economic recession in Asia in that year, the 300% increase in 
Iraq’s oil output between 1996 and 1998, and the inflation-reduced value of revenues generated 
under the old price range.  A second price range of $23-$30 was established in 2000; 
coincidentally, it was equivalent to the old range adjusted for inflation. The four years 2000-2003 
were all within the new range (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Target Price Ranges 
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III.  The Tradeoff: Price Stability and Military Security 
Between them, Persian Gulf countries have 75% of world’s known reserves and more 
than 50% of the world’s remaining resources of crude oil (see Table 4).  At the same time, 
extraction costs are less than $5 per barrel (Chapman and Khanna, 2001, and Financial Times, 
2003).  Why then don’t these countries pursue a low-price policy that would increase their sales, 
market share, and possibly revenues?  Conversely, why didn’t they seek to earn higher profits by 
charging monopoly prices before 2004?  The answer to these questions lies in the joint pay-offs 
under the price band arrangement to Persian Gulf producers, and also to the importers of Gulf oil 
in the West (see also Chapman and Khanna, 2001).   
Production costs in the lower 48 states of the U.S. are around $15-20 per barrel, and 
about $25 per barrel in the Artic National Wildlife Refuge (Chapman, 2001).  When prices are 
below $15, crude oil production in the U.S., which has been steadily declining since the early 
1970s, falls even more rapidly as high-cost facilities are shut down and drilling plummets.  
American oil producers’ revenues are affected twice: first by reduced production, and second by 
a lower price.  Therefore, at very low oil prices, U.S. petroleum companies move to influence 
American policy to raise prices, as in 1986 and 1998. 
In contrast, with very high oil prices, American consumers and oil-using businesses 
formerly dominated American policy.  Congressmen from states without oil production called 
for termination or reduction of military support for Persian Gulf governments.  American policy 
considered withdrawing military and political support of the Gulf governments at either extreme 
of the price spectrum.1
For the Persian Gulf producers, a long-term perspective is essential.  Their economies are 
1  The role of Congressmen from oil consuming states was evident in 2000 in a period of high prices (see New York 
Times March 2, 19, 23, & 29, 2000).  They were strongly critical of Gulf governments until prices declined. 
9critically dependent on crude oil revenues and it was in their interest to keep prices within a 
range that ensures a healthy rate of extraction.  If prices are “too low,” Persian Gulf producers 
are likely to face domestic economic problems, even though world demand rises and their share 
in the global crude oil market is likely to rise as well.  Conversely, when prices were “too high,” 
American support for Gulf governments changed to criticism.  At the same time, high prices act 
as a break on the economies of their key importers, and these Western governments then have an 
incentive to reduce oil consumption.  
Furthermore, by maintaining a steady supply of oil at prices that are acceptable to 
Western countries, Persian Gulf governments ensure a critical quid pro quo from their Western 
allies.  Assuming the average price over the remainder of this century is about $50 per barrel, the 
oil in the Persian Gulf region is worth about $75 trillion (see also Chapman and Khanna, 2004, 
Table 13).  This enormous wealth can be a serious problem insofar as it creates an incentive for 
military action such as the Iraqi invasions of Iran and Kuwait.  Military support from U.S. and 
European allies was crucial in turning back the 1990 invasion, and we see this military support as 
a major incentive to the Persian Gulf countries for maintaining crude oil prices within the target 
range before 2004.  Khanna and Chapman (2004) have shown that during the eleven year period 
from 1989-1999, the relationship between arms trade and oil trade was extremely close.  The 
world’s largest crude oil exporters were the primary importers of conventional weapons, even 
after incorporating the influence of other factors such as the nature and strength of political and 
economic institutions, and the existence or potential for armed conflict.  
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IV.  Military Security  
Iraq’s invasions of the oil regions of Iran (1980) and Kuwait (1990), if successful, would 
have gained for Iraq control of nearly half of known oil reserves and a fourth of total remaining 
resources (see Table 4 below).  Success in these two invasions could have encouraged an Iraq 
influence, control, or occupation of the remainder of the Gulf countries.  In this case, Iraq would 
have held three-fourths of known global reserves and one-half of remaining oil. 
In reaction to these concerns, Persian Gulf governments undertook major military 
expansion in the 1990s.  In the six years between 1994 and 1999, three Gulf countries -- Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) -- purchased a quarter of the global supply of 
conventional weapons, spending nearly $67 billion in weaponry (see Table 2).2  The total 
population in these three countries was about 25 million.  In other words, these three countries 
expended more than $2,500 per capita on arms and 13% of their Gross Domestic Product over 
this period (see Chapman and Khanna, 2004, Table B7, for population and GDP data on Persian 
Gulf countries).  
 
2  Earlier, Chapman and Khanna (2001) analyzed similar data for a smaller three-year period. 
Table 2: Value of Arms Transfer Deliveries by Major Supplier and Recipient Country 
(Cumulative 1994-1999, millions of current dollars) 
 
       Supplier 
 
Recipient  
Total     US UK France Russia Germ- China
any 
Other
NATO 
Middle 
East 
Other 
East 
Europe 
Other 
West 
Europe 
Other 
East 
Asia 
All 
Others 
World  274,685 158,695 32,140 22,395 16,440 8,580 3,960 10,130 4,880 5,770 5,970 1510 4,215
Developed 
US 
Israel 
Russia 
France 
Germany 
Japan 
135,925 
8,380 
8,625 
590 
1,955 
5,425 
13,920 
99,590 
- 
7,500 
420 
1,750 
4,900 
13,900 
3,625 
2,450 
0 
0 
0 
180 
0 
11,210 
380 
0 
0 
- 
0 
0 
2,160 
90 
0 
- 
0 
0 
0 
6,535 
740 
750 
0 
0 
- 
0 
50 
50 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4,390 
2,650 
5 
0 
70 
130 
0 
2,150 
700 
0 
0 
5 
110 
0 
540 
130 
20 
170 
0 
0 
0 
2,750 
350 
0 
0 
0 
60 
0 
610 
460 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2,315 
380 
250 
0 
110 
0 
0 
Developing 
China 
Taiwan 
138,760 
4,375 
21,460 
59,105 
180 
13,330 
28,515 
70 
0 
11,185 
0 
8075 
14,280 
3,300 
0 
2,045 
0 
0 
3,910 
- 
0 
5,740 
40 
0 
2,730 
470 
0 
5,230 
140 
0 
3,220 
0 
0 
900 
0 
60 
1,900 
110 
10 
OPEC 
Iran 
Kuwait 
Saudi Arabia 
UAE 
77,280 
2,440 
6,625 
54,045 
6,015 
33,010 
0 
4,200 
25,800 
1,260 
24,970 
0 
1,275 
20,900 
260 
8,145 
0 
310 
3,600 
2,950 
2,995 
995 
750 
0 
520 
210 
0 
0 
60 
0 
1,030 
900 
0 
0 
0 
1,870 
20 
0 
1,055 
480 
100 
10 
0 
0 
0 
1,495 
350 
50 
0 
210 
2670 
30 
10 
2,250 
30 
230 
70 
0 
0 
90 
555 
15 
10 
80 
200 
NATO              61,845 44,365 3,275 2,310 775 3,470 190 4,055 1,170 245 1,025 460 505
Sources:  Based on ACDA (1998, Table III) and BVC (2002, Table III) 
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Seventeen of the nineteen September 11, 2001 hijackers were born in Persian Gulf 
countries.  In addition, seven of the nine apparently highest-ranking leaders of Al Qaeda are from 
Saudi Arabia or its neighbors (Chapman and Khanna, 2004).  The May 2003 attacks against 
Westerners in Saudi Arabia were made primarily by Saudis.  Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda 
apparently see the governments of Saudi Arabia and the other southern Gulf nations as semi-
colonial agents of the U.S.  In part, the Al Qaeda political program is focused on the goal of 
replacing the Persian Gulf monarchies because of their strong association with the U.S.  This was 
clearly expressed in a recent bin Laden audiotape: 
“The occupation of Iraq is a link in the Zionist-crusader chain of evil.  Then comes the 
full occupation of the rest of the Gulf States to set the stage for controlling and 
dominating the world.  For the big powers believe the Gulf and the Gulf states are the key 
to controlling the world due to the presence of the largest oil reserves there.”3
Later in the year, another Al Qaeda leader claimed credit for a May 2004 attack on a Saudi 
Arabian compound housing oil company personnel.  Abdel Aziz al-Muqrin (CSM 2004) asserted 
“Our heroic fighters were able, by the grace of God, to raid the locations of the 
occupying American oil companies … which are plundering Muslims’ resources.  [The 
Saudi government is] supplying the United States with oil, according to their master’s 
wish, so that their economy does not collapse.” 
Recent attacks against oil export facilities in Saudi Arabia and Iraq were apparently undertaken 
by groups operating independently of Al Qaeda, but influenced by a similar ideology.4
3 BBC News Online – UK Edition, translated transcript of audiotape said to be of Osama bin Laden on 4 January 
2004, page 1.  Also see CNN March 1997 interview with Osama bin Laden, especially transcript pages 1, 2, and 5. 
 
4  Wall Street Journal, May 5, 2004. 
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V.  Global Oil Resources and the Persian Gulf; U. S. Imports 
Total remaining resources are estimated to be 2.855 trillion barrels (see Table 3).  This is 
the sum of three components.  “Known Reserves” (similar in meaning to “Proved Reserves”) are 
relatively firm values used in developing near-term production plans.  It is the minimum amount 
of crude oil that is expected to be produced from a field or reservoir.  “Potential Reserve 
Expansion” is a probabilistic concept and constitutes a best-guess estimate of additional future 
production beyond a proved reserves estimate at an existing site.  As geological techniques have 
improved, potential reserve expansion has become more important in petroleum resource 
planning.  For an existing field under production, remaining resources are the sum of “Known 
Reserves” and “Potential Reserve Expansion.”  “Undiscovered Resources” is a term used by the 
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS).  It could be roughly translated as “approximate probability 
distribution estimates of oil resources in areas which have not been explored in detail.”  It is a 
category that relies on extrapolation.  Suppose Area A is a region that has been producing for 
many years and has been extensively investigated.  Known reserves are set at 500 million 
barrels.  Area B is the same size with apparently identical geology.  The undiscovered resource 
for Area B may have a mean estimate of the same 500 million barrel figure, with a 95% 
probability of at least 400 million barrels, and a 5% probability of 600 million barrels. 
Figure 3 shows the changing nature of the probability distributions for “Original 
Resources.”5  At every probability level, the estimates have increased.  For the latest assessment, 
the range between high probability low resource estimates and low probability high oil resource 
estimates has increased.  For the 5% probability level, the estimate of original endowment has 
 
5  Original resources refer to the amount of oil existing before production began in 1859.  It combines the amount of 
cumulative production to date with the remaining resources estimate. 
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grown by 1.5 trillion barrels.  Petroleum resources in the Persian Gulf are shown in Table 4.6  
The dominant position of the Persian Gulf countries is evident.  The region holds 76% of known 
reserves and 54% of estimated total remaining resources.  The uniquely low production costs in 
the Persian Gulf (at about $5 per barrel, compared with $20-25 per barrel for new fields in the 
U.S. and Europe) multiplies the importance of this region. 
6  The 5% high resource estimates are used in Table 4 because we assume (a) the Figure 3 probability distributions 
will continue shifting rightward for some time, and (b) at some future date the real price of oil will pass $50, 
creating new incentive for increased recovery.  
15
 
Table 3: Probability 5% of Remaining World Oil Resources 
Category Billion barrels 
Known Reserves 883 
Potential Reserve Expansion 682 
Undiscovered Resources 1,290 
Total Remaining Resources 2,855 
Source: USGS (2000, 1995), MMS (2000) 
 
Note: The 2000 Assessment data used a January 1, 1995 benchmark date.  
Production in the 9 years 1995-2003 was 218 billion barrels, implying a 
current remaining resource estimate of 2,637.  World cumulative production 
1859-2003 has been 957 billion barrels, implying an original endowment of 
3.6 trillion barrels.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Change in Probability Distribution of Original Resource Endowment 
Estimates 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Chapman (2001)
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Table 4: Persian Gulf, 2000 Assessment (billion barrels) 
Country 
Cumulative 
Production 
Known 
Reserves 
Reserve 
Expansion 
Undiscovered 
Resources 
Original 
Endowment 
Remaining 
Resource 
Rem. Res. 
% World 
Bahrain        0.9 1.1 0.8 1.7 4.5 3.6 0%
Iran        
        
         
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
33.7 105.0 74.8 100.5 314.0 280.3 10%
Iraq 22.4 100.1 71.3 83.9 277.7 255.6 9%
Kuwait & NZ 31.0 93.6 66.6 7.2 198.4 167.4 6%
Oman 3.6 7.3 5.2 7.3 23.4 19.8 1%
Qatar 5.0 9.2 6.6 6.4 27.2 22.2 1%
Saudi Arabia 72.8 283.5 201.9 160.9 719.1 646.3 23%
UAE 15.7 72.9 51.9 15.5 156.0 140.3 5%
World 708 883 682 1,290 3,563 2,855 100%
Total Persian Gulf 185.1 672.7 479.0 383.4 1,720.2 1,535.1 54%
(% World) (26%) (76%) (70%) (30%) (40%) (54%)
Rest of the world 539 859 612 1,107 3,117 2,578 90% 
U.S. 169 24 70 183 446 277 10%
1. Some rows and columns do not add exactly because of rounding. 
2. Remaining resources are the sum of Known Reserves, Reserve Expansion, and Undiscovered Resources. 
3. The EIA estimate, using a similar approach and somewhat different sources, for remaining resources is a nearly identical world total 
of 2.93 trillion barrels.  See EIA (2004a, page 36). 
4. Reserve expansion in Persian Gulf extrapolated from ratio of total Rest of World Expansion (612) to Known Reserves (859), or 0.712. 
5. Together Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia have 66% of known reserves, 61% of reserve expansion, and 47% remaining resources. 
6. Current crude consumption per year: World, 30 Bbl.; U.S, 7.5 Bbl.  U.S. crude production: 2 Bbl. 
 
Sources:  USGS (2000); USMMS (2000); Chapman and Khanna (2004). 
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Tables 5 and 6 illuminate the U.S. situation.  U.S. imports are growing rapidly at about 
4% annually.  This is partly due to rising U.S. consumption, which is now approaching 8 billion 
barrels per year.7  But even in the hypothetical case of stabilized U.S. consumption, imports (less 
exports) must continue to grow because of the declining production in Alaska and in the lower 
48 states.  Oil production in the Artic National Wildlife Refuge would be costly in both 
economic and environmental terms, and would only slow (not reverse) this trend of growing 
imports.  Table 6 shows the 13 leading sources of U.S. petroleum imports.  China is the only 
major oil producer that does not export petroleum to the U.S. (China is also a net importer).  
Eight of the thirteen countries listed in Table 6 are now involved in war or major internal 
conflict.  Appendix A lists all of the 67 companies importing crude oil into the U.S. in 2002, with 
their total imports and imports from the Persian Gulf.  Given the broad corporate network that 
handles world trade in crude and products, major production losses in any one exporting country 
do not necessarily cause significant near term supply problems for importing countries.  (British 
Petroleum, owner of 80% of Prudhoe Bay production, is not considered a major importer 
because it produces U.S. oil for use in the U.S.)   
But, in the long run, as U.S. and world oil consumption continue to grow, the role of the 
Persian Gulf countries will increase in importance, both in terms of quantity and value.  The U.S. 
including Alaska is past its production peak.  North Sea production is probably at its maximum.  
In contrast, the Persian Gulf has produced a much smaller proportion of its original endowment 
(11%) than the U.S. (38%): see Table 4.   
 
7  We use 25%-26% of world consumption, a proportion that has not changed in 20 years.  U.S. and world 
consumption have grown at the same rate.  
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Table 5: Basic U.S. Petroleum Data   
 1995 
(billion barrels) 
2003 
(billion barrels) 
Annual Change 
(%) 
Consumption 6.47 7.32 +1.6 
Exports 0.35 0.37 +0.7 
Imports 3.22 4.47 +4.2 
Domestic Production Total 3.15 2.88 -1.1 
-   Alaska 0.54 0.36 -4.9 
-   Lower 48 1.85 1.74 -0.8 
-   Natural Gas Liquids; Other 0.76 0.78 +0.3 
Notes: Each entry includes both crude oil and petroleum products.  Consumption includes 
small amounts of ethanol. 
 
Source: EIA (2004b). 
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Table 6: U.S. Petroleum Imports, Major Sources (2003) 
Source Thousand barrels/day % U. S. Total 
*Saudi Arabia 1,774 14% 
*Iraq 481 4% 
*Other Persian Gulf 246 2% 
*Total Persian Gulf 2,501 20% 
Canada 2,072 17% 
Mexico 1,623 13% 
*Venezuela 1,376 11% 
*Nigeria 867 5% 
UK 440 4% 
*Algeria 382 3% 
*Angola 371 3% 
*Colombia 195 2% 
Norway 270 2% 
Russia 254 2% 
Other 15 Countries 1,913 16% 
Total 33 Countries 12,264 100% 
1. Imports are overwhelmingly crude oil rather than products or natural gas 
liquids.   
2. Asterisk denotes the authors’ judgment of existence of severe current or 
potential internal conflicts.  
3. Percentages do not add to 100% because of rounding error. 
 
Source: EIA (2004). 
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VI.  The $75 Trillion Prize: Roads to the Future 
For the past two decades, the problems of production and price stability have been 
addressed by the reciprocal arrangement that constituted the target price band.  Persian Gulf 
countries maintained stable oil output and prices and, in return, their Western allies provided 
military security (for example, the U.S and European militaries helped turn back the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990).  Today, the price framework is facing major difficulties due to the 
unstable military and political situation in Iraq (and to some extent in Saudi Arabia).  Political 
instability, the spread of conventional (and nuclear) weapons, and the growing ferocity of the 
military conflicts and terrorist activities in, or originating in, the Persian Gulf are indicative of a 
breakdown of civil authority in the region.  This has affected the coordination necessary for the 
effective management of production and prices and destabilized the price framework in the near 
term.  World oil markets experienced a risk premium on the order of $10-$15 per barrel for much 
of 2004.   
However, the economic logic underlying the target price arrangement remains intact for 
the long term.  Thus, an era of stable oil prices can be obtained if there are: 
(a) political or military institutions in place that deter appropriation of the oil wealth in the 
Persian Gulf.  This includes protection against control of oil by the providers of military 
security,  
(b) national governments in this region that are supported by their citizens, and  
(c) acceptable oil revenues to the governments of this region. 
With extraction costs at $5 per barrel, Persian Gulf oil is the lowest cost petroleum in the 
world.  This cost estimate includes exploration, capital investment, a return on capital, and a risk 
allowance.  Throughout the Persian Gulf every dollar above $5 is a dollar of additional producer 
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surplus.  So when the world price is $50 per barrel, as it was in October 2004, the profit or 
economic rent per barrel is $45.  However, for the remainder of this century, assume that $50 per 
barrel represents the economic rent from Persian Gulf crude oil.  This yields a value of $75 
trillion for the remaining resources in the Persian Gulf.8  
This, then, is the global problem: $75 trillion in oil wealth in an area with 120 million 
people.  This enormous wealth has been an attraction to Western oil companies and 
governments; it was also the goal of the Iraqi invasions of Kuwait and Iran.  Recognizing the 
threats to their stability, the governments of the Gulf acquired considerable weaponry in the 
1990s and strengthened their alliances with the U.S.  At the same time, the continuation of 
monarchies and dictatorships seems to have stimulated the growth of Al Qaeda, and the armed 
attacks against the U.S. on September 11, 2001 in the U.S., and elsewhere.  
Any global policy that leaves Persian Gulf nations undefended invites future aggression 
from within or outside the region, with the goal of that aggression to seize and hold oil wealth.  
Thus a “hands-off” policy that relies on self-government and sovereignty for each country in this 
region is unlikely to succeed in the future.9  Of course, such aggression is not an immediate 
threat today, but the prize remains, and the countries of this region continue to amass weaponry. 
 Can the U.S. provide the necessary security?  The U.S. has demonstrated military 
strength that is clearly adequate to deter or defeat any Persian Gulf nation or regional power that 
might consider the pursuit of Gulf oil.  However, the presence of American armed forces on all 
13 of Iran’s borders is a major concern.  The acquisition of nuclear weapons will appeal to some 
in Iran’s leadership as a means to deter possible U.S. invasion.  For Russia, China, and perhaps 
8  This is obtained by multiplying the remaining resource estimates in Table 4 by $50.  Discounting, of course, gives 
lower values.   See Table 13 in Chapman and Khanna (2004). 
 
9  The severe defect in this approach was made evident by Iraq that saw a $75 trillion prize, and fought to seize it 
through war.  All together, the first two Iraqi wars killed a nearly million combatants and civilians.  
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France, the maintenance or expansion of nuclear weapons capability will seem a potential 
counterweight to growing American power.  Overall, an American security framework in the 
Persian Gulf is likely to expand rather than reduce weapons capabilities (conventional and 
nuclear), regionally and globally. 
A unilateral approach suffers from serious economic and political defects.  The major 
consumers of Persian Gulf oil include Europe, China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the 
Philippines.  As long as the U.S. (and to a lesser extent the U.K.) manage security, these 
countries are able to free-ride and have no incentive to participate in security measures.10  But 
the U.S. will experience considerable difficulty in attaining legitimacy as the sole influence on 
the governing authority in Iraq.   
 An international security framework would have some potential advantages.  Given the 
success experienced from 1986 to 2003 with the price range system, an international approach 
ought to be able to manage stable oil production and prices, and generate sufficient revenues for 
Gulf governments.  With participation from the U.S. and others, it would be able to deter wars of 
appropriation of Gulf oil.  As an international group, it would be well placed to forestall control 
of the region’s oil by any security providers in the international organization.  In contrast to a 
unilateral system, a multilateral system would have lesser problems with legitimacy, both 
internationally and in the Gulf region itself. 
However, any important and successful international structure must have the U.S. taking 
a leadership role.  U.S. participation must be significant both militarily and organizationally.  
The military dimension could perceivably be patterned after NATO.  As with NATO, a Persian 
Gulf Organization would include major military powers, and also nations that see themselves as 
in need of military protection.  Potential participants would be the 8 Persian Gulf States, the 
10   We thank Richard Fullerton, U.S. Air Force Academy for this point. 
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U.S., the U.K., China, France, Japan, Germany, Russia, and perhaps members from Africa, Latin 
America, and the Middle East.  It might be financed by a tax on oil exported from the Gulf.  
Such revenues (both tax revenue and revenue from export oil sales) could be allocated to Gulf 
States, and also utilized to support the military forces employed to protect and stabilize the 
Persian Gulf. 
 Insuring popular support for Persian Gulf governments is particularly challenging.  If the 
goal is stable global oil markets at reasonable prices, then there is logical motivation to 
encourage the democratization of governments in the Gulf.  Yet the understandable U.S. quest 
for democratization in the region appears to have been set back by the reaction to the Iraqi 
occupation, itself an effort at democratization.  A still different outcome might be that democracy 
and elections in some Gulf countries could bring to power governments fundamentally opposed 
to the U.S. and its allies.  As discussed above, Al Qaeda’s political support is based upon its 
fervent opposition to Gulf monarchies, American influence, and secularism.  A security system 
linked to a continuation of the monarchies would seem to accelerate popular support for Al 
Qaeda-type policies and actions.  (Perhaps unexpectedly, a Defense Science Board report makes 
a similar observation (p. 36).) 
 The international political difficulties surrounding the issues of Iraqi weapons, inspection, 
disarmament, and occupation all indicate the problems to be encountered in establishing an 
international system.  There is no certainty that an international structure is feasible.  On the 
other hand, a unilateral framework is even less likely to contain the growing instability 
throughout the Gulf region.  What is needed is a rethinking of the global role of Persian Gulf oil, 
and the significance of democracy (and its absence) to the security of the region.  This paper has 
not provided definitive answers, but has raised what we believe to be useful questions. 
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Appendix A: Company Network Importing Oil into the U.S., 
  Total and Persian Gulf, January – December, 2002 (1000 barrels) 
Company Total Persian Gulf % Persian Gulf 
Totals: 3,302,012 802,891 24% 
Chevron Corp 264,555 133,243 50% 
Motiva Enterprises LLC 246,619 203,527 83% 
Phillips 66 Co 233,958 24,842 11% 
Exxon Co USA 219,197 70,758 32% 
Mobil Oil Corp 201,803 9,204 5% 
Sunoco Inc 198,113 2,428 1% 
Valero Mktg & Supply Co 195,576 120,088 61% 
Marathon Ashland Petro LLC 170,267 77,313 45% 
Amoco Oil Co 156,733 32,861 21% 
Flint Hills Resources LP 138,454 7,898 6% 
Citgo Petro Corp 130,634 13,421 10% 
Shell Oil Co 110,102   
Conoco Inc 95,155 617 1% 
Lyondell Citgo Refg LP 89,117 9,525 11% 
Phillips Petro Co 85,454 14,564 17% 
Port Arthur Coker Co 61,243 2,969 5% 
BP Oil Supply Co 52,970 2,260 4% 
Atofina Petrochemicals Inc 46,018 19,009 41% 
The Premcor Refg Group Inc  44,039 6,313 14% 
Orion Rfng Corp  44,007 1,447 3% 
El Paso Merchant Energy-Petro  42,490   
Arco Prod Co 38,080 6,095 16% 
Murphy Oil USA Inc 36,810 7,012 19% 
Chalmette Refg LLC  32,387   
Tesoro Petro Corp  30,311   
Citgo Asph Refg Co  23,978   
PDV Midwest Refg LLC  23,794  517 2% 
Equiva Tradg Co 21,383   
United Refg Co 21,286   
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Company Total Persian Gulf % Persian Gulf 
Tesoro Hawaii Corp 19,233   
Williams Refg & Mktg LLC 18,628   
Cenex Harvest States Coop 16,827   
Shell Chem LP  16,766   
Diamond Shamrock Refg & Mktg  15,522 2,415 16% 
Lion Oil Co 12,508 12,508 100% 
Shell US Tradg Co 12,161   
Crown Central Petro Corp  11,774   
Ultramar Inc  11,249 632 6% 
Hunt Crude Oil Supply Co  10,627 5,370 51% 
Sinclair Oil Corp  10,460   
TPI Petro Inc  9,805 7,515 77% 
Giant Yorktown Inc  9,007    
Fina Oil & Chem Co 8,882 4,039 45% 
Frontier Oil & Refg  8,438   
Ergon Refg Inc  6,638   
Strategic Petro Reserve  5,767   
Koch Supply & Trading Co  5,656 1,039 18% 
Trigeant Ltd  5,421   
Vitol S A Inc 4,667   
Shell Oil Prodts US  4,499   
Bayoil USA Inc  3,462 3,462 100% 
Edgington Oil Co  3,235   
Farmland Indus Inc   2,553   
Montana Refg Co  2,183   
Nexen Mktg  1,903   
Flying Petro Inc 1,653   
Statoil Mktg & Trdg (US) Inc  1,096   
Morgan Stanley Capital Grp Inc 1,074   
Husky Trdg Co  1,004   
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Company Total Persian Gulf % Persian Gulf 
NCRA  971   
Atlantic Trdg & Mktg Inc 948   
Equilon Enterprises LLC  882   
Cannat Energy Inc 664   
Hess Energy Trading Co LLC 548   
Marquest Ltd Ptnrshp 406   
Equistar Chemicals LP 252   
Texaco Refg & Mktg Inc 110   
The data are based upon operating companies; consequently Chevron and Texaco are separate 
entries; and so are Exxon and Mobil; and BP, Amoco, and Arco.  We do not know the cause of 
the apparent difference in reported proportions of U.S. imports from the Persian Gulf for 2002 as 
reported in this Appendix (24%) and Table 6 (20%).  The EIA is the source for both tables. 
 
Source: EIA (2002).  
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